

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX 5. d.

BASIC INTELLIGENCE PLAN  
"BLACKLIST" OPERATIONS

CONTENTS

	Page
SECTION I Introduction	1-2
SECTION II Conditions in JAPAN after Collapse or surrender	2-3
SECTION III General Military Organization	3-4
SECTION IV Operational Intelligence	4-5
SECTION V The Handling of Captured Enemy Documents	5-7
SECTION VI Interrogation Prisoners of War and Suspects	8-9
SECTION VII Naval Intelligence Plan	9
SECTION VIII Exploitation of Air Intelligence Objectives	9-10
SECTION IX Seizure of Primary Intelligence Targets	10-11
SECTION X Counter Intelligence	11-14
SECTION XI Civil Censorship Responsibilities	14
SECTION XII Signal Communications	15
SECTION XIII Economic, Scientific & Technological Intelligence	16
SECTION XIV The Intelligence Organization in Tokyo	16-17

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

SECTION I

INTRODUCTION

UNCLASSIFIED

1. This memorandum contemplates intelligence measures in a transitory situation where Japan agrees to surrender; no absolute demarcation in operational requirements is possible between: a) combat, b) pre-surrender and c) surrender phases. A transient situation permits local provisional measures but the long range effect of further occupations, at a later date, must be considered.

2. This memorandum defines broad intelligence responsibilities though delegation of certain functions is already provided for or contemplated.

3. General intelligence problems will be enormously magnified, in contact with a fanatical population; there are no docile natives, as on New Guinea or a pro-American population, as in the Philippines; every Japanese national is an enemy; all intelligence may become operational intelligence; sabotage and under-ground resistance are doubly menacing because of complicated language and race psychology. All intelligence agencies must face this sinister background and re-orient their general activities; an acute shortage of language personnel requires close coordination of functions in the language field.

4. During the transitory phases, there will be certain general tasks connected with intelligence; the majority of them may be started simultaneously by the appropriate intelligence staffs; they are set out in an estimated order of priority:

- a. The immediate seizure of Intelligence Objectives.
  - b. The arrest and/or Intelligence control as specified by C-in-C AFPAC of:
    - (i) Persons whose names appear on suspect Lists.
    - (ii) All General Staff Corps officers (and equivalent Naval and air officers) who have not been taken into custody as prisoners of war. (See Section X).
    - (iii) Persons in certain specified positions of authority; officials of certain prescribed organizations, viz:
      - Supreme Military Council
      - Cabinet Ministers
      - General Staff (Army & Navy)
      - Staffs of Military Districts (Army & Navy)
      - Staffs of Staff College (Army & Navy)
      - Staffs of Military and Naval Academy (Army & Navy)
      - Staffs of Training and Depot Establishments (Army & Navy)
      - Political Assn. of Greater Japan (Dai Nippon Seiji Kai)
      - \* Kempei Tai (Military Police)
      - \* Tokumu Kikan (Army-Navy Secret Intell. Service)
      - Koku Sui-To (Extreme Nationalist Party)
      - Chizakura (Nat. Party - Manchuria)
      - \* Kokuryu Kai (Black Dragon Society)
      - Nissho, and related Extremist or Terrorist Societies
      - Teikoku Zaigo Gunjin Kai (Imp. Reserve Assn.)
      - Sotei Dan (Union of Able Bodied Men)
      - Shonen Dan (Youth Assn.)
      - Seinen Dan (Young Men's Assn.)
  - c. The destruction of the Japanese organization (\*) for espionage, sabotage and subversive activities.
  - d. Survey of the organizations of the Japanese Armed Forces to facilitate demobilization and disarmament.
  - e. Survey of Japanese Military, scientific and technical developments and their application to peace and war.
  - f. Preservation and scrutiny of documents and archives in order to acquire maximum knowledge of Japanese methods and organization.
  - g. Organization for the censorship of civil communications Japan.
5. The classification of categories of P.W. or civilian suspects, under Par. 4B (iii) above, emphasizes the joint character of operational

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

intelligence (O.I.) and counter-intelligence (C.I.); the use of joint interrogation and translation centers, civilian internment camps adjacent to PW camps, preparation of standard questionnaires giving guidance on O.I. and C.I. interrogations and the selection of certain P.W. and suspects, for more intensive investigation, etc, suggest themselves as indispensable joint measures. (See Section X)

6. There is an identity of interest between operational intelligence counter-intelligence and public safety (as represented by Military Government, the Provost Marshal, etc.)

It is essential that at all levels there should be complete unanimity on policy and that collaboration in action is continuous. This can be accomplished by the formation of joint committee of representatives of Theater G-2, Army or District G-2, Counter Intelligence, Provost Marshal General and Military Government, to be known as J.C.I.S., (Joint Committee on Intelligence Security).

7. In order to carry out these tasks, it will be necessary for all the Services to reorganize their Intelligence facilities and to make additional Intelligence personnel available. The guiding principle is that, so far as is practicable, continuity in personnel, methods and channels should be observed.

It is anticipated that the operational stage will lead gradually into "Blacklist" condition; in such circumstances it will be necessary for similar Intelligence Plans to be put into effect either partially or wholly during the operational stage in occupied areas, in analogous situations under "Olympic" and "Coronet".

## SECTION II

### CONDITIONS IN JAPAN AFTER COLLAPSE OR SURRENDER

1. Since the Japanese, as a nation, have not previously experienced an overwhelming defeat terminating in either collapse or unconditional surrender, no precedent is available for guidance; the problem is largely one of Japanese psychology not readily appreciated by the Western mind. Historically, Japanese have surrendered unconditionally to other Japanese; as a nation they have bowed to the demands of Western Powers in situations involving a threat of war; they have at least locally, suffered a high degree of disorganization as result of major disasters. It is not believed, however, that these experiences furnish a sufficient index by which the behavior and reactions of the Japanese population could be accurately measured.

2. Attitude of People and Officials under the conditions assumed in Par. 1 - a, of Basic Plan. The following discussions (\*) present aspects of the situation under several conceivable contingencies to gauge the attitude of people and officials, viz:

CASE a. Surrender of the Japanese Government Before Invasion of any of the Home Islands.

The administrative structure would be basically intact and the transfer of authority from the Japanese Emperor and the Japanese Government to the Allied Military Government would be in an orderly manner. Japanese administrative officers would be instructed by their Emperor to remain in office. A number sufficient to carry on essential functions would probably comply. Their efficiency would be low for some time, but that condition would have to be treated with some tolerance because it would be due primarily to factors such as: (1) great mental and emotional confusion over facing a situation without precedent in Japanese experience; (2) conditions arising out of air raid damages, including disruption of the chain of command from a centralized authority, loss of homes and relatives, and lowered physical condition.

The Japanese people would be in immediate need of food and shelter; they are amenable to direction and intrinsically obedient, and probably would comply with Allied orders and try to go about their daily tasks. Their efforts to help themselves would tend to be ineffective for a while, because there would be widespread confusion, both psychological and physical. It would be essential to forestall disorders arising out of dire need for daily necessities.

(\*) Dept. of State Extracts.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

As a result of extensive bombing and fire damage, Japanese industry would be generally disorganized, transportation disrupted and the distribution of food seriously impaired. In such a situation many business and financial leaders would be willing to cooperate with the occupying forces in bringing some degree of order out of the existing chaos.

Beneath the surface there would soon be maneuvering among Japanese political elements, with various groups struggling to gain sufficient following to come forward in due course to build a new Japanese Government.

CASE b: The Japanese Government Surrenders  
After Invasion of One of the Home Islands Other than Honshu.

Under this assumption, conditions would be essentially the same as under case (a), except in the invaded area where confusion arising out of death and injury, lack of food and shelter, and the destruction of public utilities and other facilities would be greater.

CASE c: The Japanese Government Surrenders  
After the Invasion of Honshu.

Under this assumption, conditions would be similar to but still more confused than those under case (b). Administrative difficulties would be greater because of the increased degree of disruption to the chain of command from a centralized authority, there would be increased disruption of the Japanese economy, and a greater number of people would be affected by death and injury, lack of food and shelter and the destruction of public utilities and other facilities.

CASE d: The Japanese Home Islands Have Been Invaded and Organized Resistance Therein Has Ceased but the Japanese Government Has Not Surrendered and Has Gone Underground.

Under these circumstances, the occupation authorities would not have the advantage of assistance by the Emperor and the Japanese Government in bringing about a cooperative attitude on the part of the Japanese people and of Japanese administrative officials. It would be fruitless for the occupying forces to set up an interim Japanese Government to assist in this matter as its lack of constitutional authority would deprive it of influence. The factors leading to confusion, inefficiency and disorder would be at maximum strength and would require great efforts on the part of the occupation authorities to prevent chaos. Many administrative officials would refuse to continue in office under the direction of the Military Government. The lack of a mandate from a Japanese Government to stay at work and the probable issuance of orders to sabotage the Allied effort would aggravate the inefficiency and confusion of those continuing in office. This condition, plus almost complete disruption of the chain of command from a centralized authority and maximum disruption of the national economy would greatly increase administrative difficulties.

### SECTION III

#### GENERAL MILITARY ORGANIZATION

1. In connection with determining the intelligence organization of units involved in the occupation of JAPAN, the commander's mission and the characteristics of the population are of paramount importance. As to the former, the specific tasks assigned commanders are given in subpar 3.c. (1)(b), beginning on p. 13, "Basic Outline Plan for 'Blacklist' Operations".

2. The general coordination and control of JAPAN are vested in the Commander-in Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific. The areas of initial occupation, taken into our control in 3 Phases, are given in subpar 3.a. on p. 6, "Basic Outline Plan". It should be noted that this same subpar indicates that other areas may have to be occupied.

3. Intelligence policy in all its aspects is formulated by General Headquarters. Armies are responsible for the detailed planning of the intelligence organization for their respective areas of occupation. They keep GHQ informed of the progress made in their planning, to ensure that they proceed along similar lines and that no divergencies occur which might create a gap in the overall picture.

4. a. It is evident that much larger intelligence organizations will be needed by occupation units than formerly sufficed in combat.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Suitable personnel will have to be selected from other staff sections and subordinate units.

b. The intelligence organization of a unit in an urban area will differ markedly from that of an identical unit in a rural area. It would therefore be impracticable to draw up uniform T/O&Es for the intelligence organizations of occupation units.

5. As plans are carried to the point where final estimates can be made of the intelligence personnel requirements of units, tentative selections thereof should be made or they may be requested from higher authority where they might be made available as in the case of CIC personnel.

#### SECTION IV

##### OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

1. The Operational Intelligence Staffs within Armies will be confronted with a mass of information requiring analysis and evaluation for use by their own Disarmament and Disbandment Staffs. The main role of GHQ, AFPAC will be to supplement this information and produce Intelligence guidance on long-term policy. As usual, the greatest sources of information, collected locally by Armies, will be documents and interrogation reports.

2. The information will be required for various purposes, which can be broadly set out as follows:

- a. Tactical requirements.
- b. Planning requirements.
- c. Checking of information supplied by the Japanese.
- d. Technical Intelligence.
- e. Military Intelligence research.
- f. Air Reconnaissance.

3. TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS: Responsibility for Operational Intelligence in its present form will continue, probably on a diminishing scale. It will still be necessary for Intelligence Staffs to cover all aspects of tactical Intelligence required in establishing control over the Japanese armed Forces and in initiating their disarmament.

4. Intelligence Staffs will need to work in intimate contact with Counter Intelligence Staffs, who follow closely all matters connected with underground movements. They will also be required to follow the political trends in their areas. (See Sec. x)

5. PLANNING REQUIREMENTS: Intelligence Staffs will be required to provide the Intelligence on which the plans for the disarmament and disbandment of the Japanese armed forces are based. Work on this will probably prove the most onerous of Intelligence tasks. In certain areas, where almost all records have been destroyed, it may prove necessary to recreate such records as are required, by the use of interrogation reports.

6. CHECKING OF INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY THE JAPANESE: Japanese commanders will be instructed on surrender to submit immediately information regarding order of battle, locations, strengths, equipment and stocks. It will, however, be essential that such information be subjected to constant checks to prevent any attempts at evasion or concealment. For this reason, Intelligence Staffs continue to maintain their own order of battle and estimates.

7. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE: The normal tasks of Technical Intelligence will continue in the occupational period. After the cessation of hostilities, Technical Intelligence will have to search for what technical developments have been made and are being used in secret. In addition, Technical Intelligence will be required to help in certain disarmament problems. (See Sec. XIII)

8. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH: It will be necessary and advisable to initiate enquiries on:

- a. How Japan fought the war in all its army aspects.
- b. The accuracy of our own Intelligence estimates.
- c. The collation of certain long-term Intelligence, such as topography or engineer Intelligence.

9. AIR RECONNAISSANCE: The need for Air Reconnaissance, both visual and photographic, will remain. It will be devoted mainly to checking that

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

Japanese troop concentrations are being carried out as directed; that there is no unwarranted rail activity; and that dumps and installations are not being interfered with. Photographic interpreters will be required to continue their functions in this respect. Consideration should also be given to long-term plans for Air Reconnaissance for survey, topographical and other purposes.

## SECTION V

### THE HANDLING OF CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS

#### THE PROBLEM OF DOCUMENTS:

1. In view of the peculiar dependence of the Japanese on the written record, every detail of military life and administration is committed to paper. The vital importance of intelligence obtained from captured Japanese documents has been realized, and directives have been issued on their seizure, exploitation, and processing. In the "BLACKLIST" period, the general principles of the inter-Service handling of documents hitherto in force will continue in accordance with GHQ SWPA SOPI No. 23, dated 8 September 1944, and GHQ AFPAC SOPI No. \_\_\_\_\_ dated \_\_\_\_\_ (in preparation).
2. As the occupation of Japan proceeds, documents will become available in greater quantity than ever before; they will be of much wider application than those found in countries previously occupied by the enemy, in that they will be essential in all aspects of Military Government.
3. During the operational phase, the main emphasis is immediate exploitation of documents of operational importance. The problem in any area of Japan in which organized resistance has ceased is of a different character. The continued evacuation of documents will prove impossible because of their great bulk and volume; it will be inadvisable because their removal would hamper the establishment of civil control, the process of disarmament and disbandment, and the tasks of research. It will, therefore, be necessary for Language Detachments to select for evacuation through normal channels to Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, GHQ, only such documents as are of immediate general importance. The remainder will, so far as possible, be left "in place" after arrangements have been made for their safeguarding. Documents which cannot be so left must be carefully collected in central repositories to await final disposition.
4. A great number of agencies will be searching for documents, and it is required that all such agencies register with the Army ATIS Advanced Echelon of the District in which they will be operating. It must be impressed on them that, although they are free to collect what documents they require, permission to take them out of the area must be obtained from the Army ATIS Advanced Echelon concerned, and the removal registered there. There are represented at GHQ AFPAC, many agencies who will require to see documents for action in Japan before they are evacuated.
5. The vast majority of documents will, however, remain "in place". It will therefore be necessary to notify all interested agencies of what is available and where it is to be found. This will be done by each Army ATIS Advanced Echelon preparing and circulating locally, lists of the documents available in their areas. Copies of these lists will be sent to ATIS GHQ, who will disseminate them as required.
6. There will be types of documents which can only be efficiently evaluated in Washington or which require detailed analysis and research. These classes of documents will be sent to ATIS GHQ for action.
7. A more difficult problem arises regarding the selection of documents which as a matter of policy must not be left in Japan. Such as those dealing with the war efforts and organization of the armed forces and the War Diaries and studies of the various campaigns. To leave such documents intact in Japan would give any future Japanese General Staff the groundwork for creating a fresh military machine and the data for an examination of their errors in strategy and tactics in this war. It will be necessary for all such documents to be specially listed and marked as documents that must eventually be evacuated or destroyed.

UNCLASSIFIED

8. Special efforts will be made to secure all records and plans of the following:

- (i) The central Japanese government, Japanese military organizations, engaged in military research, and such other governmental agencies as may be deemed advisable.
- (ii) All police organizations, including security and political police.
- (iii) Japanese economic organizations and industrial establishments.
- (iv) Institutes and special bureaus established in Japan devoting themselves to race, political, and similar research.
- (v) Documents required by the various echelons of Japanese Government and Armed Forces Command in exercise of their functions under United States Control must remain accessible to the Japanese Authorities concerned.

DOCUMENT PROCEDURE:

9. A brief summary is given below of the policy to be adopted in handling documents:

- (i) All documents seized must be safeguarded.
- (ii) Only documents of immediate general importance will be evacuated. Those required by Japanese Government and Command Agencies operating under United States Control will remain accessible to Japanese Authorities concerned.
- (iii) Evacuation through established military channels ATIS GHQ.
- (iv) No documents will be removed by anybody without the permissions of the local ATIS Advanced Echelon.
- (v) Document so removed must be registered at the local ATIS Advanced Echelon.
- (vi) Location lists of documents will be circulated.
- (vii) The greatest care should be taken when removing documents to remove them in the order in which they are found, and to disarrange them as little as possible. It is especially important that documents dealing with any piece of machinery or equipment, e.g., Radar, should not be separated from the material to which they refer.
- (viii) Documents of purely C.I. interest, may be evacuated through C.I. channels. After exploitation by C.I. they will be passed to ATIS GHQ. C.I. may, if desirable, freeze any document important for Counter Intelligence operations, subject to the authorization of the senior Intelligence Officer at the headquarters concerned.
- (ix) All cryptographic documents will be expeditiously handled as prescribed in GHQ SWFA SOPI No. 23, dated 8 September 1944, and GHQ AFFAC SOPI No. \_\_\_\_\_, dated \_\_\_\_\_ (in preparation).

RESPONSIBILITIES OF GHQ AFFAC:

- 10. (i) Establishment of ATIS at GHQ AFFAC, of Advanced ATIS at ADVON AFFAC, and of an ATIS Advanced Echelon at Tokyo.
- (ii) Co-ordination of all matters of inter-Service relationship regarding documents.
- (iii) Direction on the types of documents which must be left "in place" and those which are required for ultimate evacuation from Japan or destruction, as a matter of policy.
- (iv) Arrangement for making available to the Navy of records required by them.
- (v) Liaison with M.I.R.S., War Dept., on documents policy, problems and procedure.
- (vi) Detailed analysis of documents as required.

UNCLASSIFIED

**UNCLASSIFIED**

- (vii) Receiving and complying with requests for information on documents.
- (viii) Supply of copies of documents held at ATIS Advanced Echelons.

#### RESPONSIBILITIES OF ARMIES:

- 11. (i) Arranging for seizure and safeguarding of documents.
- (ii) Detailed planning for the handling of documents throughout their areas of responsibility.
- (iii) Establishment of such ATIS Advanced Echelons as may be required in addition to those Language Detachments and ATIS Advanced Echelons operating with Divisions, Corps, Armies, and Task Forces.
- (iv) Requisitioning for all equipment required in their areas, including microfilm and laboratory apparatus.
- (v) Action on requests for documents held locally, either by producing the original or copies.

#### TOKYO:

12. From the purely military point of view, the biggest and most important collection of documents should theoretically be found in Tokyo or vicinity. It may therefore be necessary to create an ATIS Advanced Echelon of suitable proportions, with adequate reproduction resources. This ATIS Advanced Echelon should initially be organized on an integrated basis, and will be established by GHQ AFAC under the G-2 Advance Section. GHQ AFAC will arrange for the supply of the necessary equipment.

#### NAVAL DOCUMENTS:

- 13. Naval documents will be transferred to Naval authority in accordance with arrangements between CINCPAC and CINCPAC. (See Section VII)
- 14. Naval Intelligence is responsible for informing Army and Air Intelligence Staffs of any matters of military or air interest arising from Naval documents.
- 15. Documents of inter-Service interest exploited by Army or Air Staffs will subsequently, if applicable, be passed by them to the Navy.

#### AIR FORCE DOCUMENTS:

- 16. Air Force documents, including documents concerning the JAF Supply Services and the organization of the Japanese aircraft industry, must be transferred to the nearest Air Force or Air Corps Intelligence Officer. These will be processed through Air Force channels to ATIS.
- 17. As some JAF documents contain information of importance to ground forces, it is the responsibility of Air Intelligence to inform Intelligence Staffs of the contents of such documents and make them available for inspection or reproduction.
- 18. Documents other than Air Force documents which interest Air Intelligence will first be exploited by the Army Intelligence and will then be passed to the nearest Air Intelligence. These documents will be returned after exploitation through normal Army channels.

#### DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR DOCUMENTS:

- 19. Such documents in the custody of the protecting power (neutral) will be respected.
- 20. Documents not in the custody of the protecting power (neutral) will be guarded pending instructions from GHQ AFAC as to their disposal.
- 21. If substantial reason exists for believing diplomatic or consular premises were used for warlike operations, the protecting power (neutral) may be asked for permission to search the premises. If this permission is delayed unreasonably; CINCPAC, will decide whether or not the search is to be initiated.

**UNCLASSIFIED**



~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION VI

INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND SUSPECTS

POLICY OF INTERROGATION:

1. In the BLACKLIST period, the shift in emphasis from the interrogation needs of Operational Intelligence to those of Counter Intelligence, will become more pronounced. An increase in the number of interrogators, trained in Counter Intelligence methods, if practicable, will therefore be required.

TYPES OF PERSONS TO BE INTERROGATED:

2. (i) Ordinary PW or disarmed Japanese of purely C.I. interest.
- (ii) Ordinary PW or disarmed Japanese with a C.I. background.
- (iii) Civilians, such as members of the Black Dragon or other terrorist societies, who have been arrested on C.I. instructions.
- (iv) Internees in concentration camps.
- (v) Technical, scientific, economic, financial, etc., experts.

ORGANIZATION OF ATIS INTERROGATION CENTERS:

3. ATIS GHQ will continue to operate at present location until such time as Japan is occupied by its permanent garrison. ATIS Language Detachments and CIC detachments, augmented by Japanese-speaking personnel, will normally remain with their organic tactical units. CIC units, however, may be reassigned according to the exigencies of the situation. ATIS units may be reinforced by teams and detachments of Divisions, Corps, and Armies not involved in the occupation. ATIS Interrogation Centers and Language Detachments will be given C.I. training, if practicable, and will be augmented by C.I. personnel so that each unit is capable of conducting both Intelligence and Counter Intelligence Interrogation.

4. Selectees for detailed interrogation will be sent to ATIS or ADVATIS. Special arrangements will normally have to be made, according to circumstances, for the interrogation of Japanese financial, economic, scientific, and other experts.

CIVILIAN INTERNMENT CAMPS:

5. When Japan has been fully occupied, or when Military Administrative Districts are set up in the rear of our advancing forces, internment camps for civilian suspects may be established as required by Army Commanders. The Intelligence control of these camps will be the responsibility of Intelligence staffs, to be allocated for the purpose by Army Commanders. It is desirable that internment camps should be set up in the immediate neighborhood of PW camps, to facilitate interrogation problems. Certain types of PW of C.I. interest may be segregated and held, pending instructions for their final disposal.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF GHQ AFPAC:

6. (i) Preparation of questionnaire giving guidance on O.I. and C.I. interrogation and the selection of suitable PW.
- (ii) The establishment of ATIS Interrogation Centers.
- (iii) The channel through which all requests for Intelligence from interrogation are submitted by U.S. agencies, outside GHQ.
- (iv) The channel through which Intelligence obtained from interrogation is passed back to U.S.
- (v) To co-ordinate when necessary the work of ATIS Interrogation Centers.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF ARMIES:

7. (i) Setting up of the necessary interrogation facilities.
- (ii) Provision of interrogators. These men should be drawn from existing Army (Corps) interrogation personnel, and augmented by C.I. personnel.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

NAVAL INTERROGATION:

8. See Section VII.

AIR INTERROGATION:

9. It is not generally intended that Air representation at AFIS Interrogation Centers established in Japan will consist of more than screening officers. Air Interrogators will be attached or given access to interrogation centers and internment camps, and will be given facilities to interrogate persons anywhere likely to be in possession of information of Air interest.

SECTION VII

NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

1. In general, Naval intelligence activities in JAPAN Proper will be based upon the principles of complete access and full interchange of information between the Army and Navy, and that of prompt transfer of appropriate intelligence material to the Navy.

2. Detailed arrangements between CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC covering Naval intelligence activities in JAPAN Proper will be disseminated to agencies affected at appropriate times.

SECTION VIII

EXPLOITATION OF AIR INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

1. DEFINITIONS:

For general convenience, captured or surrendered installations, material, documents and persons of particular interest to the Air Force Intelligence organizations are referred to in this document as Intelligence Objectives or Targets.

The first Air Intelligence Objective becomes that of immediate neutralization of all aircraft and airborne weapons, in place, at the moment of surrender -- augmented by the further condition that all air flights of any nature must cease immediately, as of the moment of surrender, until effective control measures are established.

By exploitation of Intelligence Targets is meant the seizure, safeguarding, preliminary interrogation of persons and their subsequent processing; and the recording, preliminary scanning and subsequent processing of documents to the appropriate collating agency.

2. AUTHORITY:

Air intelligence targets to be investigated will include:

- a. Information necessary for the disarmament, demobilization and demilitarisation of the J.A.F. and its associated para-military associations.
- b. Intelligence Targets contributing to the termination of the war against JAPANESE satellites:
- c. Intelligence concerning the extent of JAPANESE-GERMAN interchange of scientific and technical developments.
- d. Intelligence check on the effectiveness of Allied air operations as well as a check on the accuracy and completeness of Air Intelligence estimates.
- e. Technical intelligence for research purposes.

3. ORGANIZATION:

Subject to coordination with AFPAC, the Air Force will be responsible for:

**UNCLASSIFIED**

UNCLASSIFIED

a. Air Intelligence for disarmament purposes through appropriate channels to AFPAC.

b. Intelligence policy for air disarmament problems.

4. MACHINERY FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT:

During this period, Intelligence Objectives will be exploited by:

a. Normal Air Intelligence gathering agencies now in the field, including Technical Intelligence and Air P/W Interrogation Teams.

b. By Staffs of U.S. Air disarmament formations.

Normal Air Intelligence gathering agencies, following the advancing armies will continue, as at present, to exploit Air Intelligence Objectives. After surrender or collapse of resistance, Air Intelligence agencies and staffs will be made available to disarmament staffs as circumstances require for specialized intelligence investigations.

5. EXPLOITATION OF INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES:

Intelligence officers will be attached to field formations of FEAF disarmament formations, when deployed, for the purpose of screening and reporting to higher headquarters. Intelligence staffs will determine by examination of Intelligence Objectives whether air documents should be evacuated or remain in place.

Target lists will be prepared by AFPAC and other Air Force agencies, particularly those concerned with Technical Air Intelligence.

Special operations may be mounted against particular cities or areas in which there are concentrated a large number of Intelligence Objectives. Special Army Detachments ("T Forces") may be organized to seize and guard Intelligence Objectives in these areas. Qualified air personnel, charged with the investigation of all Air Intelligence Objectives within these areas will be attached to teams of specialists and interrogators.

Where air teams are not available for exploitation of Air Intelligence Objectives, by arrangement with Armies, seizure of such objectives will be entrusted to local forces.

6. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE:

Although most of the primary Intelligence Objectives will be designated, the normal method of collecting technical Intelligence in the field by specialized Intelligence Officers (TAIU) or teams will continue.

7. INTERROGATION:

Specialized Air Force Interrogators will be attached or have access to all Interrogation Centers, Internment Camps (Military and Civil). In general, it is not intended that Air representation at detailed Interrogation Centers in JAPAN will consist of more than screening officers. (See Section VI)

8. SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE:

This forms the subject of separate inter-Service instruction.

SECTION IX

SEIZURE OF PRIMARY INTELLIGENCE TARGETS

1. a. The War Department and other Washington agencies have studied the JAPANESE internal situation in detail and selected "sources" where it is estimated particularly important intelligence may be found.

UNCLASSIFIED

b. Such sources of needed intelligence are termed "intelligence targets", and it is evident that they will be particularly concentrated in urban areas. These targets may include any or several of the following:

- (1) Records and documents found in certain army hqs, buildings, ministries, factories, government agencies, etc.
  - (2) Persons of certain categories such as Imperial Headquarters officers; known scientists of a certain research laboratory, etc.
  - (3) Material and equipment, including munitions and materials of all kinds and those found in a certain factory, etc.
  - (4) Industrial plants.
  - (5) Agencies of diverse kinds such as the headquarters of a particular unit or type of unit, ministries, news bureaus, universities.
  - (6) Military or naval establishments or installations.
2. a. Early seizure, securing, and exploitation of such targets are essential according to priorities set by GHQ.
- b. By furnishing Military Police or, in an emergency, even a combat unit, in reserve, unit commanders will often be able to facilitate seizure and provide the temporary guard for a valuable target.
3. The detailed organization for the exploitation of intelligence targets will be the subject of later orders.
4. Certain targets are of primary interest for exploitation by air and naval commands, which will take the appropriate action indicated by the nature of the target. (See Section VIII and VII).

## SECTION X

### COUNTER INTELLIGENCE

1. GENERAL: The surrender of Japan or a substantial part thereof will alter the general mission of Counter Intelligence operations. In addition to insuring military security by denying information to the enemy, Counter Intelligence personnel will be confronted with the problem of suppression of organizations, individuals and movements whose existence and continued activities are considered an impediment to the lasting peaceful reconstruction of Japan. The nation wide character of organizations and movements within this category, and the dislocation of population which may precede our occupation will necessitate coordination and control of Counter Intelligence activities by General Headquarters, USAFFAC.

2. Personality Cards containing names of persons constituting a menace to Allied security should be compiled from Counter Intelligence files, to be supplied to Armies. Counter Intelligence staffs in the field will seek out and arrest all persons in Annexes A, as qualified thereafter by CinC AFPAC, especially members of the KEMPEI TAI, TOKUMU KIKAN, KOKURYU KAI, NISSHO and other extremist societies; see also Section I, paragraph 4.

3. Internment camps, for apprehended persons, will be established in accordance with local requirements; the Intelligence control remains the responsibility of Intelligence staffs, to be allocated for this purpose by Commanders; armies will provide for interrogation facilities at Internment camps, as necessary; further particulars regarding interrogations are in Section VI.

4. Lists of Headquarters of KEMPEI TAI, TOKUMU KIKAN, the KOKURYU DAI and other extremist societies are being supplied to Armies, covering towns and districts on their axis of advance. Commanders will arrange for the seizure of such premises. All persons found therein will be detained pending the arrival of Counter Intelligence officers. All documents will be seized and preserved for expert examination. (See Section V; also Annex A of this Section).

### ELIMINATION OF EXTREMIST SOCIETIES AND PREVENTION OF THEIR REBIRTH:

5. The KEMPEI TAI, TOKUMU KIKAN, the KOKURYU DAI, other extremist societies such as NISSHO, and all affiliates will be dissolved. See Annex A and B, this Section.

### DISPOSAL OF THE JAPANESE GENERAL STAFF:

6. G-2 GHQ will collect lists of all officers of the General Staff, to be furnished Naval Commands, Armies and Air Staffs for co-ordinated action.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

7. GHQ AFPAC will be responsible for the control and disposition of Japanese Imperial Headquarters. Army Commanders are charged with control and disposition of subordinate headquarters and echelons of command within their respective areas of responsibility. Certain elements of these headquarters and echelons of command will be retained in being for the period necessary to disarm and demobilize the Armed Forces of JAPAN.

8. All General Staff Officers who have not been taken into custody as Prisoners of War, Officers who have adverse records, or are on Counter Intelligence Personality Cards, or listed as War Criminals, and any officer who is regarded as potentially dangerous, will be detained. In cases of officers functioning in Headquarters temporarily retained in being as outlined above, they will retain such liberties as are essential to performance of their assigned duties, subject to surveillance arranged by Counter-Intelligence in consultation with military authorities concerned.

#### PREVENTION OF JAPANESE ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES:

9. Normal Counter Intelligence activities against enemy espionage, sabotage and subversive activities will be continued vigorously and intensive security education programs will be instituted to alert the troops to the vigilance necessary while present in enemy territory. The employment by Japanese of foreign nationals for espionage must be balanced by an adequate counter-espionage service coordinated with the theater G-2 on matters of theater level interest.

#### RESPONSIBILITIES OF GHQ, AFPAC:

10. This Headquarters will be responsible for the following:
  - (i) Direction of Counter Intelligence policy in Japan.
  - (ii) The supply of all necessary Counter Intelligence information. In order to discharge this function, Counter Intelligence will undertake the maintenance of a central Card Index of suspect personalities. It will also maintain a central record of all persons arrested and their locations.
  - (iii) Establishment of a policy regarding disposal of arrested suspects.
  - (iv) The setting up of a joint C.I. and O.I. organization for interrogation. For particulars, see Section VI.
  - (v) Technical research on sabotage and advice concerning preventive measures.
  - (vi) Coordination of Counter - Espionage on Theater level.

#### RESPONSIBILITIES OF ARMIES:

11. Armies will be responsible for the following:
  - (i) Measures to implement the policy of GHQ.
  - (ii) Execution of Counter Intelligence measures in their respective areas.
  - (iii) Build-up and organization of Army and Corps (District) C.I. Staffs.
  - (iv) Organization of central registry and records system.
  - (v) Coordination of the interchange of information between subordinate units.
  - (vi) Report to GHQ.

#### NAVY AND AIR:

12. For particulars of Naval and Air Counter Intelligence, see Section VII and VIII respectively. These staffs will work in close cooperation with Army C.I. staffs.

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

LISTS OF ARRESTED PERSONS:

13. It will be necessary for a record of all persons arrested and their locations to be held centrally, so that immediate information is available to ascertain whether a suspect has already been arrested and where he is held.

ANNEX "A" SECTION X:

1. When the American Forces occupy Japan it will be necessary to arrest and detain a considerable number of persons in order to achieve the two main objects of safeguarding the security of the American Forces and accomplishing the destruction of Japanese organizations.

2. In addition to the Black List, the following categories of suspects will also be arrested and detained: (See Notes Below)

- a\*. Imperial Household
- b. Supreme Military Council: All personnel
- c\*. Privy Council
- d\*. Cabinet Ministers
- e\*. Vice Ministers
- f\*. Regional Superintendents - General of the 8 Administrative Districts
- g\*\*. General Staff (Army and Navy)
- h\*\*. Staffs of Military Districts in occupied countries and territories (Army and Navy)
- i. Staffs of Staff College (Army and Navy)
- j. Staffs of Military and Naval Academy
- k. Staffs of Training Establishments (Army and Navy)
- l. Kempei Tai
- m. Tokumu Kikan (Army and Navy)
- n. Koku Sui-To (Extreme Nationalist Party)
- o. CHIZAKURA (Connected with Manchuria)
- p. Kokurya Kai (Black Dragon Society)
- q. NISSHO and other extremist or terrorist societies.
- r. Administrative Officials of TEIKOKU ZAIGO GUNJIN KAI (Imp. Reserve Assn.)
- s. Administrative Officials of SOTEI DAN (Union of Able Bodied Men)
- t. Administrative Officials of SHONEN DAN (Youth Assn.)
- u. Administrative Officials of SEINEN DAN (Young Mens Assn.)

\* Subject to such limitations and detailed instructions as are specified in directives on Military Government, to be issued.

\*\* Subject to such limitations and detailed instructions as are specified in directives covering disarmament and demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces, to be issued.

ANNEX "B" SECTION X:

Offices and organizations which will be disbanded and cease to function at once, and in the case of which no problem of the disarmament and disbandment of para-military formations arises. Dissolution must cover all branch offices.

1. Political Association of Greater Japan (DAI NIPPON SEIJI KAI).

This Association extends through Regional Prefectural and City or County levels down to District Group or City Ward Branches and Neighborhood Associations. For the purposes of military government by means of Hoko it may be desirable to preserve the lower levels of the above organizations such as the District Group or City Ward Branches and Neighborhood Associations.

- a. Political Affairs committee.
- b. Headquarters, sub-divided into the following sections.

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- (1) Propaganda and enlightenment.
  - (2) National defense.
  - (3) Civilian life.
  - (4) Increased production.
  - (5) Youth movement.
  - (6) Party organization section.
  - (7) House of Representatives Section.
2. Nation-Wide Associations.
- a. Combat Corps.
  - b. People's Volunteer Corps.
  - c. Student Corps (GAKU DO TAI) succeeds Young Mens Association (SEINEN DAN).
  - d. Industrial Patriotic Service Association.
  - e. Agricultural Patriotic Service Association.
  - f. Patriotic Service Corps.
  - g. Mechanized National Defense Association.
  - h. Maritime Transportation Total Superintendence Section (with control offices at Kobe, Niigata, Fushiki, Tsuruga, Funakawa).
  - i. Shipping Management Association.
3. Organizations of Scientists.
- a. Technical Board.
  - b. Japanese Technical Society.
  - c. Science Mobilization Association.
  - d. All Japan Science League.

## SECTION XI

### CIVIL CENSORSHIP RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Effective censorship of civilian communications is dependent upon the centralization of the technical direction and control of censorship activities at the theater level. This control will be exercised with the primary objective of promoting military security and the peaceful future of the country and of detecting for action by appropriate agencies all activities running counter to these objectives. Since the national system of communication channels conforms to the pattern set by the physical facilities available to transmit, effective, economical censorship can be exercised only at the central points created by these physical facilities. These points may or may not coincide with those established for the purpose of effecting military government control.

2. The complication of the language problem is Japan and the paucity of linguists, require, at least initially, the compulsory use of English in communications.

3. Civil Censorship will be so conducted as to facilitate continuity of the large scale peaceful commerce required to maintain the flow of food supplies and materials for shelter to urban and other food deficient in war-ravaged areas.

4. Detailed Plan is in process of preparation to be issued later.

#### NAVAL CENSORSHIP:

5. Naval liaison Officers will be attached to GHQ AFPAC as arranged with CINCPAC, to coordinate Naval censorship with the general regulations laid down, and to provide Naval guidance where required for any civil censorship controlled by GHQ AFPAC.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~  
SECTION XII

SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS

UNCLASSIFIED

WIRE AND CABLE SECURITY:

1. Immediately subsequent to the surrender of Japan, existing enemy wire and cable circuits, both civilian and military, will to the extent necessary, be placed under strict United States Military control and restricted to the passage of United Nations military, naval and air traffic except as hereafter indicated. These systems may be used for the passing of communications and messages originated by enemy nationals and the nationals of other countries upon approval of the United States Military and Naval censors only. An active surveillance will be conducted on the circuits authorized for such use for the purpose of detecting and preventing illicit transmissions.

2. The United States Army Commanders and the Commanding General, AFWESPAC, within their respective zones of action, are charged with the responsibility for the measures necessary to insure compliance with the instructions contained in Paragraph 1 immediately above.

RADIO SECURITY:

1. To the extent necessary, military, naval, air and civilian owned radio transmitting and receiving stations (except radio receivers used for the reception of voice broadcasts) of the enemy and of the nationals of other nations will be seized, placed under strict military control and reserved for use of the United States Armed Forces and the armed forces of friendly nations except when their use is authorized for other purposes by the United States Army Commanders and the Commanding General, AFWESPAC, within their respective zones of action.

2. Active radio surveillance will be conducted in all areas for the purpose of the detection, interception and location of radio stations conducting illicit transmissions. The traffic so intercepted will be analyzed and the intelligence derived therefrom submitted to the appropriate headquarters for the necessary action.

3. United States Army Commanders and the Commanding General, AFWESPAC, within their respective zones of action, are charged with the responsibility for the measures necessary to insure compliance with the instructions contained in Paragraphs 1 and 2 immediately above.

~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED



~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

### SECTION XIII

#### ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE

1. The Japanese have made considerable progress in their industrial economy, science and technology since the beginning of the war. Their developments in these fields, particularly insofar as they have been adapted for war purposes, should be fully investigated and exploited.

2. The War Department will furnish a list of target objectives which are expected to be productive of intelligence of this nature. Responsibility for seizure of such objectives is defined in Section IV.

3. When exploitation of these objectives by experts dispatched by the War Department commences, the results acquired will fall into three broad categories:

(i) Documents: No document will be removed except under the procedure specified in Section V.

(ii) Materiel: This will normally be evacuated through established technical channels. It will not be taken out of Japan without the approval of the nearest appropriate technical intelligence staff and that staff will be responsible for forwarding this information through normal technical channels to GHQ AFPAC.

(iii) Reports of Experts: A copy of every report made will be sent to GHQ AFPAC together with all associated information obtained.

#### 4. German Intelligence.

It is possible that intelligence may be available in Japan on German inventions, manpower, technical developments, economy, etc. Such information may prove valuable in the administration of occupied Germany and should be forwarded to the War Department through normal channels.

### SECTION XIV

#### THE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION IN TOKYO

1. TOKYO, the capital, is the intelligence nerve center for the entire Japanese Empire. While the city has undergone destructive fire and demolition raids, the preponderance of military and civil organizations in the urban area lend credence to the assumption that documents and other information of extreme importance to the US Government may still be recovered; "other information" refers to the interrogation of officials, who may be apprehended when the city is occupied.

2. An advanced echelon of G-2, AFPAC, and a Document Center (ATIS Advon) may be established in Tokyo to work with sections of Signal, Ordnance and Chemical Intelligence agencies.

3. Buildings housing the following organizations are believed to contain information which will be of immense assistance in the demobilization of the Japanese armed forces and the establishment of war crimes guilt:

Imperial Palace (Archives Section)  
Imperial General Staff  
War Department  
Navy Department  
Aviation Department  
Military Police Headquarters  
War College  
Metropolitan Police Bureau  
Foreign Office  
Diet Building  
Home Office  
Communications Office

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

Inspectorate General of Military Training  
Army Engineering School  
Military and Naval Arsenals  
German Embassy

4. The attention and Counter Intelligence personnel is invited to the possibility of depredations by fanatical members of organizations such as the Black Dragon Society, the Young Men's Association, Military Police, Junior Officers' League and the military Special Service Organization (Tokumu Kikan) which has functions similar to the former Gestapo.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

[REDACTED]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

UNCLASSIFIED

Annex 5 e  
G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation  
With Respect to "Blacklist"

PART I

Military Situation:

See: "G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation, With Respect to operations Against Kyushu - Honshu (Abbreviated), 24 March 1945". "G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation With Respect to An Operation Against Southern Kyushu, 25 April 1945" as subsequently amended; "G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation with respect to An Operation Against the Tokyo Plain of Honshu, 31 May 1945" as subsequently amended; Such Additional G-2 Estimates of the Enemy Situation With Respect to Specific Areas in Japan as may subsequently Be Issued; Current "Monthly Summary of Enemy Dispositions"; Current "Daily Intelligence Summaries"; A.G.S. Terrain Studies Nos. 131, 132, 134, 136-140, inclusive; A.G.S. Terrain Handbooks Nos. 84-92 inclusive. Note: The estimates listed above contain forecasts of military dispositions to Fall 1945 (Kyushu) and Spring 1946 (Honshu); they will be currently brought up-to-date by a series of operations amendments, which reach all addressees of G-3 Staff Studies, Plans and Operations Instructions.

PART II

Economic-Demographic-Geographical Situation.

1. Introduction:

The Commander of each occupied area will be faced not only with the problem of initial control of the Japanese Military Forces in his area, but essentially also of controlling and to some extent of maintaining the civil population. Therefore resources and installations, both military and civilian, are factors in planning and executing his occupation mission. Data with respect to the above factors are covered by the current Japanese Series of the A.G.S. Terrain Studies, Special Reports and Handbooks viz;

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

	TERRAIN STUDIES No.	SPECIAL REPORTS No.	TERRAIN HANDBOOKS No.
Phase I			
Kanto Plain	132	-	99,100,101
Shimonoseki-Yawata	131,137	-	88
Kobe-Osaka-Kyoto	136	-	95, 94
Aomori-Ominato	140	-	-
Keijo-Jinsen(Korea)	-	106	-
Phase II			
Nagasaki-Sasebo	131	-	85
Nagoya	134	-	97
Sapporo (Hokkaido)	-	104	-
Otomari	-	105	-
Fusan-Chinkai (Korea)	-	106	-
Phase III			
Hiroshima-Kure	137	-	92
Kochi (Shikoku)	138	-	90
Okayama	137	-	93
Tsuruga	-	102	-
Sendai	139	-	-
Niigata	-	103	-
Taiden-Gunzan-Zenshu (Korea)	-	106	-

2. The occupation areas, and objectives, as listed in para 3-a of the Basic Plan, are shown on attached maps, in Phases I to III incl., in relation to the textual coverage of the A.G.S. Studies.


a. Areas Covered: See Maps 1 and 2.

b. Applicable Sections: Information in the respective categories is presented in all terrain studies under the following Standard sections, tables of contents viz:


Military importance	Section II
Port and Harbors	Section IV
Anchorage	Section V
Description of Coast Line	Section VI
Physiography	Section VII
Vegetation	Section VIII
Rivers	Section IX
Lakes and Swamps	Section X
Airfield and Seaplane Bases	Section XI
Roads and Railroads	Section XII
Other Transport	Section XIII
Signal Communication	Section XIV
Cities and Towns	Section XV
Resources including Water Supply	Section XVI
Population	Section XVII
Administration	Section XVIII
Medical Problems	Section XIX
Climate & Meteorological Conditions	Section XX

UNCLASSIFIED











"BLACKLIST"

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
Basic Plan, Care and  
Evacuation of Allied Prisoners  
Of War and Civilian Internees

1. Mission:

To locate United Nations prisoners of war and internees (definition: Appendix 1) in areas within scope of "BLACKLIST" operations and to provide for them adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical care. To further provide for their registration and evacuation to rear areas. All Allied prisoners of war in Japanese custody, including merchant seamen, are repatriated at the earliest possible date consistent with military operations. The urgency of this mission is second only to military operations and to the maintenance of the forces of occupation.

2. Facts and Assumptions:

- a. Best estimates indicate there are approximately 36,000 personnel of various categories located in approximately 140 camps (details: Appendix 2).
- b. In most instances this personnel will be in extremely poor physical condition requiring increased diet, comforts and medical care
- c. Poor housing and sanitary conditions will require immediate large scale transfers to best available facilities to be peremptorily commandeered.
- d. Complete reclothing will be imperative.
- e. Records in general will be incomplete for both survivors and deceased.

3. Responsibility:

- a. Commanding Generals of Armies, within their respective areas, are responsible for:

- (1) The location, care and safeguarding of all Allied recovered personnel.
- (2) Providing billets, food, clothing, comforts and medical care.
- (3) The initial processing (completion of RPD form #44 and #23, Incl 1 to Circulars 19 and 20, this headquarters, dated 9 July 1945).

**UNCLASSIFIED**

~~SECRET~~  
(4) The establishment of recoveree disposition centers near ports of embarkation as may be required.

(5) Evacuation of recovered personnel including all records, to recoveree disposition centers established by Commanding General, AFWESPAC, in the Philippines.

(6) The collection and preservation and forwarding of all records that may be captured pertaining to recovered personnel.

(7) Exacting from the Japanese Civil Government and Military Command, in their respective areas, the maximum resources and facilities available to assist in the accomplishment of (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) above.

(8) The assumption of the operation of Allied prisoner of war and internment camps located within their respective areas.

b. The Commanding General, AFWESPAC, is responsible for:

(1) The receipt, billeting, rationing, clothing and medical care of recovered personnel in recoveree disposition centers established in the Philippines.

(2) The processing and evacuation from the Philippines of Prisoners of War and civilian internees after clearance by this Headquarters, and as arranged with the Governmental authorities concerned.

(3) Equipping of teams described in 4a(1) (2) and (3) below.

c. This headquarters will:

(1) Exact from the Japanese Government and Imperial High Command such assistance in handling of Allied prisoners of war and internees as may be appropriate, reference 3b(2) (h) 1 & 2 Annex 5b.

(2) Be responsible for the organization and training of necessary liaison, recovery and final processing teams.

(3) Arrange for required Allied representatives to accompany each team.



~~SECRET~~

4. Requirements:

UNCLASSIFIED

a. Personnel:

(1) Liaison teams:

One group of 3 officers and 3 enlisted men (1 each U.S., British and Dutch) attached to each Army (3) and each Corps (7).

(2) Recovery Teams:

One recovery team for each 500 POWs (approximately 70 teams), each composed of two officers (1 U.S. and 1 British) and four enlisted men (3 U.S. and 1 British). Twelve recovery teams of 1 enlisted man each (Dutch), to be attached as needed.

(3) Final Processing Center:

One Replacement Depot augmented by one British and one Australian processing unit comparable to a Replacement Battalion.

b. Supplies and Equipment:

(1) For prisoners of war and internees:

- (a) Ample clothing and equipment to meet the needs of comfort for each individual including women and children.
- (b) Subsistence of proper type and quantity.
- (c) Medical supplies and facilities to insure adequate medical care.

(2) For teams indicated in 4a(1) and (2):

To be furnished in accordance with table of allowances to be published later.

c. First available air, motor or water transportation is used to expedite movement of recoverees from their camps through disposition centers to their final destinations. Movement by air is utilized to the maximum extent.

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

5. Source of Means:

UNCLASSIFIED

a. The Adjutant General and the Commanding General Special

Troops of this headquarters to provide and train liaison and recovery teams; Commanding General AFWESPAC will establish and operate a final processing center.

b. Army commanders and Commanding General, AFWESPAC, in accordance with 3a and 3b above, to provide security and messing detachments (4a (4)) and supplies and equipment indicated in paragraph 4b above.

c. The Commanding General of each Army and the Commanding General, AFWESPAC, are responsible to furnish air, motor or water transportation as may be needed in the movement of recoverees for whom they have responsibility under 3a and 3b above.

6. Concept of Operation:

a. Axis of evacuation:

(1) Camps where found - recoveree disposition centers - final processing center - destination: for American, Canadian, British and Australian only. Nationals of other United Nations are held in final disposition centers until provision has been made for their disposition by their respective governments.

(2) Method: Highest priority air, motor or water transportation is provided in the movement of recoverees by commanders responsible under 3a and 3b above. Movement by air is used in the maximum extent. With the exception of priority given to the evacuation and repatriation of the sick and wounded, no distinction to be made in evacuation or repatriation as regards, rank, service or nationality.

b. Letter of instruction setting forth policies and procedures for the handling and processing of this personnel are furnished later by this headquarters to all concerned.

Appendix 1 - Definition of POWs and Internees.

Appendix 2 - Detailed information on POW camps.

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
Appendix 1 to  
ANNEX 5 f

"BLACKLIST"

Basic Plan, Care And  
Evacuation Of Allied Prisoners  
Of War and Civilian Internees

DEFINITION: UNITED NATIONS PRISONERS OF WAR

1. The term, "United Nations prisoners of war", as used herein includes all personnel held in Japanese custody:
  - a. Who are or have been members of, or persons accompanying or serving with, the armed forces of any of the United Nations, or
  - b. Who as members of the armed forces of countries occupied by Japan have been captured by the Japanese while engaged in serving the cause of the United Nations and who under the rules and customs of war, should be treated as prisoners of war even though not recognized as such by Japan, or
  - c. Who are or have been members of or serving with the merchant marine of any of the United Nations.
2. Such term does not include personnel who, although formerly held in Japanese custody as prisoners of war, have accepted release from the status in exchange for employment in or by Japan. Persons in this category, after appropriate identification will be dealt with as displaced persons.

DEFINITION: CIVILIAN INTERNEE

A civilian internee is a person without a military status, detained by the enemy, who is not a national of the Japanese Empire as constituted on 10 July 1937.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

Appendix No. 2  
UNCLASSIFIED  
ANNEX 5 f

"BLACKLIST"

Basic Plan, Care And  
Evacuation of Allied Prisoners  
Of War And Civilian Internees

PRISONER OF WAR ENCAMPMENTS

JAPAN - HOKKAIDO

Name: ABASHIRI  
Coordinates: 44°01'N., 144°16'E  
Name: ASAHIGAWA  
Coordinates: 43°46'N., 142°22'E. (AIS L764)  
Name: HAKODATE MAIN CAMP  
Coordinates: 41°46'N., 140°42'E.  
Number: 400-336  
Nationality: U. S., British, Canadian, Dutch, Estonian,  
Australian  
Name: HAKODATE  
Coordinates: 41°46'N., 140°42'E.  
Number: 200  
Nationality: U. S.  
Name: HAKODATE DIVISIONAL CAMP  
Coordinates: Northwest of city in a wooded valley - faces  
south in pine-covered hills.  
Number: 400-500  
Nationality: American and British Imperial  
Name: KAMISO Detachment Camp No. 1 - HAKODATE Extension  
Camp No. 1  
Coordinates: 41°50'N., 140°40'E.  
Number: 170  
Nationality: British, U. S.  
Name: KUSHIRO  
Coordinates: 42°58'N., 144°23'E. (ANS L764)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Name: MOURORAN, Secondary Camp No. 1 - HAKODATE Sub  
Camp No. 1

Coordinates: 42°19'N., 141°00'E.

Number: 428

Nationality: U. S. British, Dutch

Name: OTARU

Coordinates: 43°12'N., 141°00'E.

Reported possibly closed

Name: RAIBA

Coordinates: 42°38'N., 140°26'E. (AMS L764)

Believed closed.

Name: SAPPORO

Coordinates: 43°03'N., 141°20'E. (AMS L764)

Nationality: One RAF

Name: TOMAKOMAI

Coordinates: 42°37'N., 141°31'E. (AMS L764)

Number: 200


Nationality: 40 women reported moved here from ZENTSUJI

**UNCLASSIFIED**

NORTHERN HONSHU

Name: AKITA  
Coordinates: 37°46'N., 140°29'E. (AMS L773)  
Number: 141  
Name: FUKUSHIMA No. 222  
Coordinates: 37°46'N., 140°29'E. (AMS L773)  
Number: 141  
Nationality: Civilian internment  
Name: FURUMAKI STATION  
Coordinates: 40°40'N., 141°21'E. (AMS L773)  
Number: 900-1000  
Name: IWAKE Coal Mine, or YUWAKI  
Coordinates: Approx. 37°02'N., 140°50'E. (AMS L773)  
Number: 1000  
Name: KAMAISHI  
Coordinates: 39°16'N., 141°53'E. (AMS L773)  
Name: KANAZAWA  
Coordinates: 36°33'50"N., 136°39'30"E. (AMS L774)  
Name: KATSUYAMA  
Coordinates: 36°04'N., 136°30'E.  
Name: KOMATSU NAVAL AIRFIELD  
Coordinates: 36°22'N., 136°23'E. (AMS L774)  
Number: 200  
Name: MATSUMOTO  
Coordinates: 36°13'N., 137°58'E.  
Name: MURAKAMI  
Coordinates: 38°11'N., 139°29'E. (AMS L773)  
Name: NAOETSU, NIIGATA KEN  
Coordinates: 37°10'N., 138°15'E. (AMS L773)  
Number: 50-300  
Nationality: Australian  
Name: NIIGATA Sub Camp No. 5

**UNCLASSIFIED**

  
Coordinates: 37°55'N., 139°03'E. (AMS L773)  
Number: 350-900  
Name: OHASHI  
Coordinates: 39°16'N., 141°44'E. (AMS L773)  
Number: 600  
Name: SENDAI  
Coordinates: 38°15'N., 140°53'E.  
Number: 27 Civilian internment  
Nationality: U. S., Canadians.

UNCLASSIFIED

  
UNCLASSIFIED

**UNCLASSIFIED**

- 5 -

# DECLASSIFIED



~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

Number: 200  
Nationality: U. S.  
Name: SUMIREJO (SUMIRE GAKUAN)  
Coordinates: Information insufficient for pin-pointing  
Nationality: One source stated camp closed. Civ. & POWs.  
Name: TAKATANOBABA  
Coordinates: 35° 42'N., 139° 42'E (AMS L 774)  
Number: 3300  
Nationality: 1108 U. S.  
Name: TOKYO SECTIONAL CAMP.  
(See HIRAOKA Camp No. 3 in area 3 Miscellaneous.)  
Name: UENO PARK  
Coordinates: 35° 42' 40"N., 139° 46'40"E. (AMS L 774)  
Name: ACHI YAMAKITA  
Coordinates: 35° 26'N., 139°39'E (AMS L 774)  
Nationality: Civilian Internment  
Name: KANAGAWA CAMP  
Coordinates: 35° 25'50"N., 139° 40'18"E. (AMS L 774)  
Number: 540-1500  
Nationality: U. S., U . K., Dutch.  
Name: KAWASAKI CAMP  
Coordinates: Reported on outskirts of town, 2 to 3 kilometers from NISSAN Auto factory.  
Number: Several thousand reported.  
Name: KAWASAKI BUNSHO No. 1  
Coordinates: 35° 31'N., 139° 42'E. (AMS L 774)  
Number: 400  
Nationality: 21 U. S.  
Name: KAWASAKI DETACHMENT CAMP No. 5  
Coordinates: 35° 30'N., 139° 28'E. (AMS L 774)  
Number: 400  
Nationality: 22 Civilians from WAKE. 256 U. S. One source reports 265 Americans.

~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

**UNCLASSIFIED**

Name: NEGISHI RACE COURSE  
Coordinates: 35° 25'N., 139° 38'30"E. (AMS L774)  
Number: 11  
Nationality: Mostly civilians, but there may be a few POWs.  
Name: NOGEYAMA PARK  
Coordinates: 35° 26'30"N., 139° 37'30"E.  
Number: 2000  
Name: OLD CITY HALL, YOKOHAMA  
Coordinates: 35° 26'30"N., 139° 37'30"E. (AMS L774)  
Number: 100  
Name: TAKAZAI  
Coordinates: KANAGAWA SECTION - unlocated, no coordinates.  
Name: TOKYO CAMP NO. 3  
Coordinates: 35° 27'N., 139° 28'E. (AMS L774)  
Name: TOKYO CAMP CO. 5  
Coordinates: 35° 28'N., 139° 38'E. (AMS L774)  
Name: TSURUMA  
Coordinates: (See KAWASAKI BUNSHO Detachment Camp No. 5 or KAWASAKI Branch No. 1)  
Name: TOTSUKA  
Coordinates: 35° 24'N., 139° 32'E. (AMS L774)  
Nationality: Civilian internment.  
Name: YOKOHAMA No. 5  
Coordinates: 35° 26'N., 139° 28'E. (AMS L774)  
Number: 1000  
Nationality: 96 U. S.  
Name: YOKOHAMA YACHT CLUB BOATHOUSE  
Coordinates: 35° 26'N., 139° 40'E., (AMS L774)  
Number: 16 women, 4 Australian army nurses.  
Nationality: Civilian internment

There is a reported POW camp adjacent to Target 52, AOF 90.17 which consists of two-storied barracks buildings 50 x 100 meters, housing 200-250 men. A Japanese PW reports that many factories

**UNCLASSIFIED**

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

in this area have special POW stockades attached to them some containing as many as 2000 men. No definite locations except that near Target 52 have been reported.

Name: ATAMI  
Coordinates: 35° 06'N., 139° 04'E., (AMS L774)  
Nationality: Officers camp

Name: CHIBA  
Coordinates: 35° 35'N., 140° 07'E. (AMS L774)  
Number: 100

Name: FUJI  
Coordinates: 35° 08'N., 138° 29'E. (AMS L774)

Name: FURASHI  
Coordinates: 35° 10'N., 138° 57'E.  
Nationality: Unlocated

Name: HAKONE  
Coordinates: 35° 17'N., 139° 02'E. (AMS L774)  
Number: 200

Name: KIRAOKA CAMP NO. 3 (Tokyo Sectional Camp)  
Coordinates: 35° 48'N., 140° 43'E.  
Number: 224. One source states 757 U. S. POWs have been here.  
Nationality: U. S. and British

Name: KITA COTYGARA MURA  
Coordinates: 35° 06'N., 140° 12'E.  
Nationality: Civilian internment.

Name: KOMINATO  
Coordinates: 35° 07'N., 140° 13'E. (AMS L774)

Name: OFUNA  
Coordinates: 35° 20'N., 139° 33'E.

Name: URAGA  
Coordinates: 35° 14'N., 139° 43'E. (AMS L774)

Name: URAWA (SAITAMA)

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

 UNCLASSIFIED

Coordinates: 35° 51'N., 139° 39'E. (AMS L774)  
Number: 56  
Nationality: Civilian internment, 3 U.S.  
Name: YAMASHITA (YAMAKITA) No. 1  
Coordinates: 35° 22'N., 139° 05'E. (AMS L774)  
Number: 48  
Nationality: 7 U.S.  
Name: YOKOSUKA  
Coordinates: 35° 18'N., 139° 38'E. (AMS L774)  
Number: 200  
Name: ZENTSUJI CAMP No. 61  
Coordinates: 34° 14'N., 133° 46'E. (AMS L775)  
Number: 800-4000, one source as of 1945, reports 468 total.  
Nationality: U. S.  
Name: ZENTSUJI SUB CAMP NO. 3  
Coordinates: Reclaimed ground near seashore. Wood and mud huts  
Number: 333  
Nationality: Dutch

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Name: AICHI  
Number: 15  
Nationality: Civilian Internment  
Name: GIFU - NAGARA HOTEL  
Coordinates: 35°27'N., 136°47'E.  
Name: NAGOYA CAMP  
Coordinates: 35°10'N., 136°55'E.  
Number: 3357 - several thousand reported December 1944.  
Nationality: 2000 U.S.  
Name: NAGOYA MILITARY INTERNMENT CAMP  
Coordinates: 35°11'N., 136°54'E.  
Name: NARUMI Sub Camp No. 11  
Coordinates: 35°05'N., 136°57'E.  
Number: 300-748  
Nationality: British, Canadian, Dutch and others.  
Name: NARUMI DAIDO ELECTRIC STEEL PLANT  
Coordinates: 35°05'N., 136°54'E. One source, 35°05'N., 136°57'E.  
Number: 700 - one source reports 100.  
Name: TSURUMI PARK  
Coordinates: 35°09'05"N., 136°55'20"E.  
Number: 3357 - one source 4000-5000  
Nationality: 2000 U. S.  
Name: UENO CAMP  
Coordinates: 34°46'N., 136°08'E.  
Name: AMAGASAKI SUB CAMP  
Coordinates: 34°43'N., 135°26'E. (AMS L889)  
Number: 192  
Nationality: U. K.  
Name: KOSHIEH HOTEL  
Coordinates: 34°43'N., 135°22'E.  
Name: MINATO KU (UNDOJO MAE)  
Coordinates: 34°39'N., 135°27'E (AMS 340738)  
Number: 2000  
Nationality: American, Australian, Indian

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

Name: OSAKA CENTRAL MARKET CAMP  
Coordinates: 34°40'N., 135°29'E. (AMS 340887)  
Number: 350  
Nationality: U. S.

Name: OSAKA PRINCIPAL CAMP  
Coordinates: 34°38'N., 135°28'E. (AMS 340738)  
Number: 500-1100  
Nationality: U.S., British

Name: SAKAI PRISON  
Coordinates: 34°34'N., 135°29'E.  
Number: 4000

Name: SAKURAJIMA  
Coordinates: 34°40'N., 135°26'E.  
Number: 900  
Nationality: U.S., U.K., and 24 civilians.

Name: SUMIYOSHI  
Coordinates: 34°36'30"N., 135°29'20"E.  
Number: 200-2000

Name: TENNOJI PARK  
Coordinates: 34°38'30"N., 135°30'E.

Name: UI EDA BUNSHO  
(See OSAKA CENTRAL MARKET CAMP).

Name: YAHATAYA, MATSUMO CHO  
Coordinates: 34°39'N., 135°26'E. (AMS 340738)  
Number: 70  
Nationality: Australian

Name: AOTANI CAMP  
Coordinates: Reported near Canadian Academy


Name: FUTATABI CIVILIAN CAMP NO. 211  
Coordinates: 34°43'N., 135°11'E.  
Number: 174  
Nationality: 131 Americans believed from GUAM

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

**UNCLASSIFIED**

Name: KAWASAKI SUB CAMP NO. 25  
Coordinates: 34°40'N., 135°11'E.  
Number: 423  
Nationality: Dutch, U. S., Australian, U. K.  
Name: KOBE  
Coordinates: 34°41'40"N., 135°11'01"E.  
Number: 100  
Name: KOBE DIVISIONAL CAMP (Sub camp No. 11)  
Coordinates: 34°41'N., 135°12'E. (AMS 340890)  
Number: 449, one source 331  
Nationality: British, Canadian, Portuguese, 20 Not accounted.  
Name: KOBE POW HOSPITAL  
Coordinates: Unlocated  
Number: 100  
Nationality: U.S., British, Dutch, Australians.  
Name: NARUYAMA PARK  
Coordinates: 34°41'N., 135°12'E (AMS 340890)  
Name: OKURAYAMA PARK  
Coordinates: 34°41'N., 135°11'E. (AMS 340890)  
Name: ORIENTAL HOTEL  
Coordinates: 34°41'N., 135°11'E. (AMS 340890)  
Probably interrogation center.  
Name: PRISON  
Coordinates: Near NANKO TEMPLE  
Number: 1200  
Name: SEKIGUCHI NO. 201  
Coordinates: 34°42'N., 135°13'E. (AMS 340890)  
Number: 55  
Nationality: Civilian internment camp  
Name: SUZARANDAI CAMP  
Coordinates: 34°45'N., 135°10'E (AMS L775)



**UNCLASSIFIED**

Name: AIOSHI  
Coordinates: 34°50'N., 134°20'E.  
Number: 300  
Nationality: U.S.

Name: AWAJI SHIMA  
Coordinates: 34°16'N., 134°57'E.  
Name: HARIMA or OO BAY CAMP  
Coordinates: 34°45'N., 134°28'E. (AMS L775)  
Number: 400  
Nationality: Dutch

Name: HIMEJI CAMP - OSAKA DIVISIONAL CAMP NO. 26  
Coordinates: 34°47'N., 134°37'E. (AMS L775)  
Number: 211-500  
Nationality: U. S.

Name: HIMEJI DIVISIONAL H.Q.  
Coordinates: 34°48'N., 134°44'E. (AMS L775)  
Number: 500

Name: HIROHATA DIVISIONAL CAMP  
(See HIMEJI CAMP NO. 26)

Name: INNO SHIMA  
Coordinates: 34°18'N., 133°11'E. (AMS L775)  
Number: 550 white - reported 100-1500 prisoners from Malaya

Name: KOBE CAMP.  
Coordinates: 34°43'N., 134°48'E. (AMS L775) (Approximate coordinates of river mouth).  
Number: 300

Name: KOCHI  
Coordinates: 33°33'N., 133°33'E. (AMS L775)

Name: KURE  
Coordinates: 34°17'N., 132°33'E.  
Number: 2000



~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

Name: KYOTO  
Coordinates: 35°00'N., 135°45'E. (AMS L775) (Coordinates of town).  
Number: 1000  
Name: MAITSURI  
Coordinates: 35°30'N., 135°19'E.  
Number: 3000  
Name: MIYOSHI  
Coordinates: 34°49'N., 132°49'E. (AMS L775)  
Name: MUKAI SHIMA (Sub Camp No. 11)  
Coordinates: 34°24'N., 133°13'E. (AMS L775)  
Number: Reported several hundred.  
Nationality: British reported by one source, total of 80.  
Name: NII HAMA  
Coordinates: 33°57'N., 133°16'E. (AMS L775)  
Number: 1000  
Name: OO BAY CAMP  
(See HARIMA)  
Name: OSAKA DIVISIONAL CAMP NO. 26  
(See FIFEJI CAMP NO. 26)  
Name: SHINGU  
Coordinates: 33°43'N., 135°59'E. (AMS L775)  
Name: SUB CAMP NO. 12  
Coordinates: Unlocated in Fertile Hills in mining district.  
Number: 400  
Nationality: U.S. and Dutch  
Name: SUB CAMP NO. 17  
Coordinates: Not known  
Number: 501  
Nationality: U. S.  
Name: TOYOOKA  
Coordinates: 35°31'N., 134°50'E. (AMS L775)

UNCLASSIFIED

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

Name: WAKAYAMA

Coordinates: 34°12'N., 135°10'E. (Coordinates of Town)  
34°10'N., 135°15'E. (Coordinates of camp, reported).

Name: YODOGAWA CAMP

Coordinates: 34°53'N., 135°43'E. (AMS L775)

Number: 153, one source reports 300

Nationality: U. S.

Name: YONAGO

Coordinates: 35°26'N., 133°21'E. (AMS L775)

Name: YURA

Coordinates: 33°57'N., 135°07'E. (AMS L775)

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

JAPAN - WESTERN HONSHU, KYUSHU

UNCLASSIFIED

Name: AINOURA, NAGASAKI Prefecture  
Coordinates: 33°11'N., 129°40'E. (AMS L571)  
Number: 300  
Name: BEPPU, OITA Prefecture  
Coordinates: 33°17'N., 131°30'E.  
Number: 200  
Nationality: Reported to be for convalescents  
Name: FUKUOKA Prefecture  
Coordinates: 33°35'N., 130°23'E.  
Name: HIGASHI MISOME CAMP (Sub Camp #10)  
Coordinates: 33°56'N., 131°16'E. (AMS L775)  
Number: 2100  
Name: KOKURA, FUKOUKA Prefecture (KOSURA)  
Coordinates: 33°53'N., 130°53'E. (AMS L571)  
Name: KUMAMOTO  
Coordinates: 32°48'N., 130°53'E. (AMS L571)  
Number: 100  
Name: KURUME, FUDUOUKA Prefecture  
Coordinates: 33°19'N., 130°57'E. (AMS L772)  
Name: MOJI  
Coordinates: 33°56'N., 130°57'E. (AMS L571)  
Number: 70  
Nationality: 233 U.S. civilians from WAKE  
Name: MOTOHAMA or MOTOYAMA (Sub Camp No. 8)  
Coordinates: 33°57'N., 131°11'E. (AMS L775)  
Number: 160  
Nationality: British  
Name: NAGASAKI  
Coordinates: 32°45'N., 129°53'E. (AMS L571)  
Number: 2000

UNCLASSIFIED

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

Name: OHAMA (Sub Camp No.9)  
Coordinates: 34°03'N., 131°40'E. (AMS L775)  
Number: 150  
Nationality: British

Name: OMINE (Sub Camp No.6) MANAGUCHI Prefecture  
Coordinates: 34°03'N., 131°13'E. (AMS L775)  
Number: 1082  
Nationality: Dutch, U.K.

Name: OMUTA, FUKUOKA Prefecture  
Coordinates: 33°01'N., 130°26'E. (AMS L722)  
Number: 100-300

Name: ONGA, FUKUOKA Prefecture  
Coordinates: 33°49'N., 130°47'E. (AMS L571)  
Number: 1000

Name: SADURAJIMA, KAGOSHIMA Prefecture  
Coordinates: 31°34'N., 130°36'E. (AMS L772)

Name: SASEBO  
Coordinates: 33°11'N., (AMS L571)  
Number: 500  
Nationality: Possibly Australian

Name: SHIMONOSEKI, YAMAGUCHI Prefecture, CHUGOKA  
Coordinates: 33°58'N., 130°58'E.  
Number: 500

Name: UBE (Sub Camp No.7)  
Coordinates: Reported 33°56'N., 131°16'E. (AMS L775)  
Number: 258  
Nationality: U.S., British

Name: YAWATA  
Coordinates: 33°52'N., 130°49'E (AMS L571)  
Number: 800-1000

**UNCLASSIFIED**

KOREA

**UNCLASSIFIED**

Name: FUSAN (PUSAN), NICHIKI  
Coordinates: 35° 06' N., 129° 02' E.  
Number: 120-500  
Nationality: Australian, American  
Name: JINSEN - NEW DIVISIONAL CAMP  
Coordinates: 37°28' N., 126°38' E.  
Number: 252  
Name: KEIJO # 81  
Coordinates: 37°32' N., 126°58' E.  
Number: 200  
Nationality: American, British & Australian  
Name: KEIJO No. 2  
Coordinates: 37°33' N., 126°58' E.  
Number: 200  
Nationality: Australian and British  
Name: KEIJO  
Coordinates: Camp reported across road from Parade ground on northeast corner of cross road on way from 78th Infantry Regiment Barracks to the Parade Ground.  
Number: 607  
Nationality: United Kingdom, Australian.  
Name: KEIJO City Prison  
Coordinates: 37°33' N., 126°57' E.  
Number: 2  
Name: KOREA Divisional Camp  
Number: 75  
Name: KONAN New DIVISIONAL Camp  
Coordinates: 39°52' N., 127°35' E.  
Number: 23  
Nationality: United Kingdom, Australian  
Name: KOREA #223  
Nationality: Civilian internment

**UNCLASSIFIED**

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

Name: KOSHU  
Coordinates: Camp reported in city of this name - may be in  
CHUSEINAN, KOKAIDO, or ZENRANAN Prefectures.  
Name: RYUZAN  
(See KEIJO #2)  
Name: SEISHIN  
Coordinates: 41°48'N., 129°48'E.  
Number: 230  
Name: REPHO  
Coordinates: 39°00'N., 125°40'E.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~





"BLACKLIST"

SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS  
OF CINCPAC PLAN "CAMPU"  
PERTAINING TO  
NAVAL AND AMPHIBIOUS PHASES  
"BLACKLIST" OPERATIONS

**UNCLASSIFIED**

I. TASKS OF NAVAL FORCES.

Conduct the amphibious phases and support thereafter the land phases of the occupation of strategic areas in JAPAN and KOREA.

Insure the clearance of mine fields.

Maintain lines of communications to the occupied areas.

Ensure the destruction or seizure of all elements of the enemy fleet.

Insure the surrender to Allied control of all enemy shipping.

Establish such naval and naval air facilities as are required for the support of the naval elements of the Occupation Forces.

II. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. Enemy Situation

Our operations in preparation for OLYMPIC will continue at an increasing rate to destroy the Japanese economic and industrial organization. Japanese shipping routes through the EAST CHINA SEA are closed. Restriction imposed upon sea communication between JAPAN and the mainland of ASIA by our surface, air, submarine, and mining operations will increase. In spite of impaired communications and heavy damage to the industrial system sustaining the major Japanese war effort there will remain, at the time of the capitulation, certain establishments which will probably be capable of supporting strong local assaults upon our Occupation Forces.

Surface forces of the Japanese Navy are no longer able to offer effective opposition, but some submarines remain capable of damaging surprise attacks.

Notwithstanding the weakness of Japanese air forces, we cannot disregard the possibility of air attacks, particularly suicide attacks, against us during the occupation.

**UNCLASSIFIED**



~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

Minefields impeding our free access to the SEA OF JAPAN and Japanese harbors and coastal waters will remain in position at the time of the surrender. Coast and harbor defenses have until the present escaped destruction at our hands and may be capable of inflicting heavy losses upon our forces.

## 2. Own Situation

During the period prior to OLYMPIC and between OLYMPIC and CORONET, a large portion of our naval forces will be rehabilitating and preparing for succeeding operations. Most of the amphibious lift will be engaged in administrative troop and cargo movements, and many ships will be undergoing overhaul. It is anticipated, however, that forces and shipping can be assembled within a reasonable time to support the occupation of the areas of first strategic importance, and that the availability of shipping will progressively improve with the approach of the OLYMPIC target date.

Prior to and during OLYMPIC, fast carrier task forces will make attacks on the Japanese home islands and will be available at any time for operations incident to the occupation of JAPAN following unconditional surrender.

Units of the amphibious support forces will be engaged in exercising control of the seas, in minesweeping, and in providing security for elements so engaged. Allowing for these and other minor commitments, it will be possible to assemble sufficient amphibious support forces for the occupation without delay.

The critical feature involved in occupying Japanese territory prior to 1 September 1945 is the timely assembly of assault shipping at the mounting areas. It is estimated that by late August about three weeks will be required for the assembly of sufficient assault shipping in mounting areas to lift the number of divisions required for the minimum initial occupation. After 1 September 1945 no serious problem is presented as most units are scheduled to commence assembling in the mounting areas for OLYMPIC. By 22 September 1945 it is estimated that there will be sufficient assault shipping available in the mounting areas to lift thirteen reinforced combat divisions and by 1 October 1945 sufficient to lift fourteen divisions.

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

3. Operations

UNCLASSIFIED

As long as the attitude of the Japanese is doubtful, dispositions, movements, and security precautions throughout the approach and occupation of each objective area will be as for an amphibious operation against an active enemy.

The planning and preparation for this operation during the period preceding 1 November 1945 will not be permitted to interfere with the preparations which must be made during that same period to insure the successful initiation and execution of the OLYMPIC operation. Neither will the planning and preparation during the period following OLYMPIC be permitted to interfere with the preparation necessary for the timely execution of the CORONET operation. It is therefore necessary that the planning and preparation for the occupation of strategic areas of JAPAN in the event of her sudden collapse or surrender be carefully integrated into the overall plans for the conquest of JAPAN.

The planning and execution will be coordinated with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific. Command responsibilities and command relationships will be as prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The naval phases of the occupation will be conducted primarily by the THIRD and FIFTH Fleets. The forces in the PHILIPPINES will support the operation according to their resources and as the circumstances may indicate at the time. The THIRD Fleet will consist essentially of the fast carrier task groups; the FIFTH Fleet will include the amphibious, support, and mine forces. The coordination and overall control of all Fleets and other naval forces will be exercised by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

After the surrender of JAPAN it is estimated that two to four weeks will be required to assemble assault shipping, mount troops, and move to the assigned areas.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

Phases I, II and III - Occupation of JAPAN by U. S. Army Forces

During these phases of the operation, selected major strategic centers of JAPAN and KOREA will be occupied by U.S. Army Forces covered and supported as required by available naval forces.

The preparation and conduct of the operations will be decentralized to designated Army Commanders and corresponding Naval Task Force Commanders to the greatest extent consistent with essential coordination. Commanders, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Armies will be charged by CINCAFPAC with the coordination of planning of operations within their respective assigned areas of responsibility.

An Amphibious Force Commander will be designated to conduct the movement to the objective of the force assigned each army. Commander THIRD Amphibious Force will move the Eighth Army, Commander FIFTH Amphibious Force the Sixth Army and Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force, the Tenth Army. The coordination and overall control of these amphibious forces will be exercised by Commander Amphibious Forces Pacific Fleet (COMPHIBSPAC).

In post-Phase I operations in JAPAN Proper and KOREA, Amphibious Force Commanders will arrange with the Army Commanders concerned for employment of short-range amphibious forces with appropriate support on a scale of one divisional lift per Army area as may be required for naval and amphibious phases of such operations.

III. NAVAL AIR FORCES

1. Forces Available

Four (4) or five (5) carrier task groups will be available for the support of the operation and can be deployed in a relatively short time. Similarly, four (4) divisions of CVE's will be available. Naval shore-based air forces probably available are listed below:

MARIANAS

	<u>July</u>	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>	<u>February 1946</u>
VPB(HL) Sqs	5	5	5	5	4	4

OKINAWA

	<u>July</u>	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>	<u>February 1946</u>
VPB(MS) Sqs		8	8	8		
VPB(HS) Sqs		1	1			

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**UNCLASSIFIED**

KYUSHU

	<u>July</u>	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>	<u>February 1946</u>
VMF Gps					3	3
VMF(N) Sqs					2/3	2/3
VMB Gps						1
VMSB-VMTB Gps						1
VPB(HL) Sqs						4

2. Operations

a. Carrier Forces

Fast Carriers

All fast carrier task groups will be assigned initially to the Third Fleet under the operational control of Commander THIRD Fleet. The fast carrier task force will provide general support for this operation.

Carrier-based aircraft will provide general support and cover, will conduct air strikes as may be required, will conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of objective areas and will maintain a show of force over these areas.

Escort Carriers

Escort carriers assigned to the occupation forces will provide air cover for the movement of these forces to the objective areas, and will provide direct air support if required.

Transport Carriers

Transport carriers will operate with the logistic support groups to provide replacement aircraft, parts, and pilots and aircrews. As required, they will transport garrison aircraft to the objective area.

b. Shore Based Air Forces

Fleet Air Wings

Fleet Air Wings will conduct extensive search and reconnaissance operations in the waters surrounding the Japanese home islands, including the INLAND SEA, and in waters adjacent to Japanese holdings on the Asiatic mainland.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**UNCLASSIFIED**

If required, they will conduct overwater search and attack on minor enemy naval forces and shipping in conjunction with submarines and other naval forces.

COMMARIANAS will provide a streamlined advanced air base assembly for early movement to YOKOSUKA. COMAIRPAC will provide three advanced air base assemblies for employment in the vicinity of KURE, SASEBO, NAGASAKI and OMINATO. He will also augment the assembly at YOKOSUKA and replace personnel and equipment drawn from the MARIANAS.

Naval and Marine air units will be installed at the naval bases as follows:

YOKOSUKA	1 VMF Gp (including 1 VMF(N) Sq)
	2 VPB (MS) Sqs (tender based initially)
	NATS Terminal
SASEBO-NAGASAKI (Site to be selected)	1 VMF Gp (including 1 VMF(N) Sq)
	2 VPB(MS) Sqs (tender based)
	NATS Terminal
KURE	2 VMR Sq
	1 VPB(MS) Sq (tender based)
	NATS Terminal
OMINATO	1 VPB(MS) Sq
	NATS Terminal

Seaplane search squadrons may be replaced by land plane squadrons if developments necessitate.

#### IV. NAVAL FORCES

##### 1. Forces Available.

Fast carrier task groups, both American and British, are organized and will be prepared to provide general air support for these operations at any time.

Elements of the forces normally used in amphibious support will be engaged in upkeep, training and minor operations during August, September and October. No difficulty is anticipated in assembling a sufficient number of these forces for the operation.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

Assault shipping during August will be actively engaged in administrative troop and cargo movements in the PACIFIC. This employment includes the SOUTH PACIFIC roll-up, amphibious training in the PHILIPPINES, roll-up of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC rear areas, and forward lift from the West Coast into the PACIFIC OCEAN areas. The preponderance of available assault transports and cargo vessels will be operating in forward lifts from the West Coast. If CAMPUS is executed during this period it is anticipated that provisional transport squadrons will be organized from the available shipping. It is estimated that approximately two weeks will be required to assemble sufficient assault shipping in the Western Pacific to mount seven combat divisions during the period 1 - 15 August, eight combat divisions during the period 15-31 August, and nine combat divisions during the period 1-15 September. In September assault shipping will be proceeding to the mounting areas for OLYMPIC. Two squadrons are scheduled to assemble in the HAWAIIAN area by 2 September while the last squadrons are scheduled to be available in the PHILIPPINES by 20 September. It is estimated that sufficient assault shipping will be available to mount eleven combat divisions during the latter part of September. Fourteen transport squadrons will be operating continuously in the WESTERN PACIFIC from October through March and will be available on relatively short notice to mount Occupation Forces as required.

A schedule of assault shipping estimated to be available in the Eastern and Western Pacific areas follows:

	<u>1-15</u> <u>AUGUST</u>		<u>15-31</u> <u>AUGUST</u>		<u>1-15</u> <u>SEPTEMBER</u>		<u>15-30</u> <u>SEPTEMBER</u>		<u>OCTOBER</u>		<u>NOVEMBER</u>
	<u>EP</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>EP</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>EP</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>EP</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>EP</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>WP</u>
APA	116	75	74	90	52	131	30	165	30	180	212
AP	17	0	17	0	17	0	17	0	0	17	17
APH	0	2	0	2	0	3	0	3	0	3	3
AKA	44	37	26	43	17	57	13	65	12	79	95
LSD	7	6	7	6	3	10	3	10	0	13	13
LSV	1	5	1	5	0	6	0	6	0	6	6
IST	100	500	100	500	125	500	100	550	50	600	600
LSM	50	350	50	350	50	350	50	350	20	380	400
APD	18	49	18	49	24	49	0	73	0	8	89

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~